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Abstract: This paper explores the conditions of acceptability of differing allocation systems under 
scarcity and evaluates what makes a price system more or less fair. We find that fairness 
in an allocation arrangement depend on the institutional settings inherent in the situation, 
such as information, transparency and competition and the perceived institutional quality 
(e.g., fiscal exchange and institutional trust). Results also indicate that the solution  “weak 
people first” is seen as the fairest approach to an excess demand situation, followed by 
“first come, first serve”, the price system and an auction system. On the other hand, a 
random procedure or an allocation through the government is not perceived to be fair. 
Moreover, economics students seemed to be less sceptical towards the price system than 
other subjects although we observe that female students are more sceptical than male 
students.  
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 “When a dish in short supply is shared at a polite dinner party, there is seldom any verbal 
dispute. If things go well, the dish gets divided without any verbal dispute. If things go well, the 
dish gets divided without any discussion or intervention by the host. When questioned, everybody 
will agree that each person should take his fair share (...) What is judged to be fair according to 
our current standards of morality depends on a complex combination of contingent circumstances 
– such as who is fat and who dislikes cheese. Moreover, if we observe what actually happens, 
rather than what people say should happen, we will find that it also depends on how each person 
at the table fits into the social pecking order. Woe betide the poor relative sitting at the table on 
sufferance in the last century who helped himself to an over-generous portion of his favourite 
dish”  
Binmore (1998, p. 275) 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economists have long believed that the central objectives of economics have been to solve issues 
of scarcity and efficiency, through the analysis of how society makes choices concerning the use 
of its limited resources (Stiglitz 1988). To achieve these goals economists have relied on the 
traditional homo economicus model, where through the pursuit of their own self interest 
individuals will achieve utility and efficiency maximization of the resources available. While this 
theory holds in many situations, recent evidence shows that individuals do not always make 
decisions based upon their own self benefit. It has been shown that motives such as altruism, 
fairness, or morality affect the behaviour of many individuals. Fairness has for a long time been 
considered of no relevance for economic analysis, however the relevance of fairness has been 
discussed in many other research areas, such as aspects of justice (Rawls 1972, Baumol 1986, 
Buchanan 1975, Sen 1987). Baumol (1986, pp. 1-2) states “... that issues of fairness are often 
more to the point than the literature of welfare economics seems to suggest (...) [and] 
economists’ reluctance to deal with these issues is not a reasoned response to an analysis of the 
problem, but a reflection of their inability until recently to get any analytic handle upon issues of 
justice in economic decision”. Singer (1999) argues that the normative concept of justice has 
been operationalised in the empirical literature as fairness. The economic justice is caught 
between two competing values of culture: individualism based on a rational agent and 
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egalitarianism, where the agent is motivated by a concern for justice and a sense of equality. 
However, this view disregards Smith’s (1790) concept of sympathy, where Smith recognises 
more motives than that of pure self interest by indicating that sympathy is a cornerstone of 
individual behaviour. He states: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their 
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” 
(Smith 1790, p. 9). Sally (2000) furthers this line of reasoning to show a connection between 
sympathy and strategy, by arguing that strategic interdependency and social interaction are 
intimately linked. Sympathy guides strategy formulation and is generated by social interaction, 
as “rational players must create mental models of other participants and this act of modelling 
naturally narrows psychological distance and creates fellow-feeling ... In addition, if common 
knowledge is to be part of the structure of a game, then the creation of such mutual 
understanding will affect the fellow-feeling among the players and may alter their basic actions” 
(Sally 2000, p. 3). 
Closely related theories have been analysed, such as: altruism, extreme altruism (self 
sacrifice), cognitive dissonance, fairness, helping behaviour, punishment and reciprocity (see e.g. 
Becker 1981, Batson 1992, Camerer et al. 2004, Coleman 1990, Elster 1989a, 1985, 1996, 2006, 
2007, Fehr et al. 2002, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Frey, Savage and Torgler, 2010a, 2010b, 
Henrich, 2004, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986a, Krebs 1991, Piliavin and Charng 1990, 
Schlicht, 1984). Tyler (1997) analyses why people obey the law stressing the relevance of fair 
procedures to enhance law obedience. Tyler and Smith (1998) state: “Studies show that 
judgments about what is “just”, “fair”, or “deserved” are central social judgments that lie at the 
heart of people’s feeling, attitudes, and behaviours in their interactions with others” (Tyler and 
Smith 1998, p. 595). Among the most common ways to analyse fairness are natural experiments 
(Kahneman et al. 1986a) and laboratory experiments (Fehr and Kirchsteiger 1994, Rabin 1993). 
People seem to be motivated by putting into account fair and equitable allocations (Dawes and 
Thaler 1988). Kahneman et al. (1986a) analyse how fairness affects market behaviour.  
Deutch (1975) identified three of the core principles that underlie many of the issues of 
distributional fairness, which included: equity, equality and need. Such that equity outcomes are 
directly proportional to inputs, equality outcomes are distributed equally, and needs based 
outcomes are allocated on the basis of those in greatest need are the first supplied (Bazerman et 
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al. 1995). This would indicate that situational factors have a very important role in determining a 
needs based allocation, leading to a welfare based outcome, where as equity is more in line with 
traditional economic rational and equality as more socially derived. The equity theory is one of 
the first models of distributive justice (Adams 1965). Tyler and Smith (1998) argue that the 
equity theory is important because it hypothesises that satisfaction and behaviour are linked not 
only to the objective outcome levels, but also to outcomes received in relation to those which 
were judged to be fair. Disadvantage in such a situation can create anger and advantage feelings 
of guilt (Adams 1965, Homans 1961).  
Fairness is not restricted to personal interactions. It influences the behaviour of 
individuals in important economic and political domains as, e.g., tax payments (Spicer and 
Becker, 1980; Spicer and Lundstedt 1976, Song and Yarbrough 1978, Torgler 2007). The 
relationship between taxpayers and the government can be viewed as an exchange relationship. 
A lack of equity between taxpayer’s own exchange and those of others creates a sense of 
distress. People will engage in behaviours such as tax evasion, designed to restore equity. 
Baumol (1986, p. 9) mentions an illustrative old example. How can we assure that two people 
divide a cake fairly? One way is that one person cuts the cake into two parts and the other then 
chooses. As Baumol states, this game can be expanded by introducing more individuals or more 
than one product. If the cake is not homogeneous and the individuals’ tastes are not identical 
“superfairness” may arise. It is the case when, e.g., the cutter judges the two pieces of the cake to 
be equal and the chooser does not. The cutters will on the one hand divide what he/she believes 
is half of the cake and the chooser on the other hand might obtain in his view more than half of 
it. Similar to this game, distribution justice has also been analysed in experiments. Güth et al. 
(1982) first introduced the ultimatum bargaining game and argue that “subjects often rely on 
what they consider a fair or justified result. Furthermore, the ultimatum aspect cannot be 
completely exploited since subjects do not hesitate to punish if their opponent asks for “too 
much” (Güth et al. 1982, p. 384). Ultimatum experiments have shown that in many experiments 
the modal offer is (50,50), the mean offer somewhere around (40,60), and the smaller the offer 
the higher the probability that the offer is rejected. Ochs and Roth (Ochs and Roth 1989, Roth 
1995) argue that it is not necessary to state that players try to be fair. Instead it is enough to 
suppose that they estimate the utilities of the players they are bargaining with. While individuals 
may have a clear concept about what is fair and may influence their strategic play, the individual 
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will adapt their ideas of fairness in response to experience and interactions with others: “... 
although the strategic environment is influenced by ideas about fairness, ideas about fairness are 
influenced by the strategic environment” (Roth 1995, p. 271). Another aspect of this game which 
focused on reciprocity, where the idea is that players cared about the intention of their 
opponents, such that players help those who have helped them and punish those who have hurt 
them (Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter 2002, Henrich 2004, Oberholzer-Gee 2007). 
Previous studies have explored the link between fairness and shortage using survey data. 
In telephone surveys of randomly selected residents of two Canadian metropolitan areas, 
Kahneman et al. (1986a) has shown that people consider the use of prices to eliminate the excess 
of demand to be unfair. This is consistent with the observation that firms do not adjust prices and 
wages as often as traditional economic theory would suggest. Moreover, we also observe formal 
laws that penalize vendors who take advantage of shortages by increasing prices for water, fuel 
and other necessities after a natural disaster (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin 2004). Frey et al. 
(2010a, 2010b) on the other hand, explore behavioural consequences of excess demand in life-
and-death situations observing that fairness and social norms can arise during such events.  
The intention of this paper is to investigate the perceived fairness of differing allocation 
system upon a scarce resource to see if the aspects of fairness do indeed shape perceptions of 
individuals. To these ends we utilize the responses of 93 students to varying allocation systems 
to rank and evaluate the fairest allocation systems. Section II discusses the data collected via the 
survey and presents the primary questions and hypotheses associated with each. Section III 
presents the empirical results and some discussion in relation to other findings. Section IV 
provides a comparative analysis of all the differing allocation systems and finally Section V 
draws some concluding remarks. 
 
 
II. SURVEY & DATA 
For the purposes of this analysis we use a survey of 93 economics students in the third semester 
undertaken at the University of Basel in 2001. This survey was aimed at shedding light on the 
individual’s perception of the relative fairness of differing allocation systems when confronted 
with an excess demand situation, with several situational treatments. The questionnaire is very 
similar to one used by Frey and Pommerehne (1988, 1993). In contrast to their household survey 
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carried out in Switzerland (canton of Zurich) and Germany (Berlin) covering the general 
population, our study focuses on the opinion of students. This has the advantage of working with 
a homogeneous subject pool. The questionnaire included also a range of basic information (e.g., 
age, gender, whether economics is their major, whether they work part-time) and further 
questions that we will discuss in the following sections. To explore perceived fairness we use a 
set of six questions pertaining to variations of the original scenario.  
 
Question 1: At a sightseeing point reachable only on foot a well has been tapped. The bottled water is 
sold from a private supplier to thirsty hikers. The price is 1 CHF (Swiss Franc) per 
bottle. Daily production, and thus the stock, is 100 bottles. On a particularly hot day 200 
hikers want to buy a bottle. As a consequence the supplier raises the price to 2 CHF per 
bottle. What do you think about this price rise? 
 
This situation forms the basis for further questions. Changes are comparable with different 
treatments in experiments. We believe that it is interesting to see how fairness consideration 
varies across the allocation types. To this base scenario, we first introduced a change in supplier, 
from private firm to a local authority (government supplier), to determine if there is a shift in 
sentiment between public and private suppliers increasing prices. Public enterprises’ 
announcement of a price rise for their services often causes strong opposition
1
. From this 
question the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
 
                                                          
1
  For example, councils in several Queensland communities have drastically increased the pricing of water, 
 e.g. Redcliffe in the Morten Bay Shire has had a 66% ($550/year) increase in water charges and an average 
 of 10.7% increase across South-East Queensland (Vogler 2010). This increase is a response to the price 
 increase put in place by UnityWater, the retail front for Queensland State Government Water run by former 
 Brisbane City Lord Mayor Jim Soorley. Soorley stated that “everyone … will have to pick up the real cost 
 of water … which includes desalination plants, recycled water facilities and the building of new pipeline” 
 (Hoffman 2010). This increase has generated anger and public outrage, residents have argued that the rise 
 is grossly unfair. The UK and Canada provide further examples. The Canadian public health system is 
 cherished by its citizens so much that it comes in 4
th
 in a recent poll of the country’s most cherished 
 features, after the flag and ice-hockey (Hebert 2010). Providing an efficient and effective health care 
 system has been a clear and persistent goal of Canadian governments for decades, but attempting to alter it 
 is fraught with danger. The Medicare system has been described as a “sacred cow” in Canadian politics, 
 any politician who discusses making fundamental changes to the system risks to be punished by the 
 electorate (Picard 2008). In recent elections all 5 parties had the same policy on healthcare. It seems that 
 the public does not accept changes in fee or charges and have historically punished politicians for doing so. 
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Hypothesis 1: Students judge the price adaptation from 1 CHF to 2 CHF to be more unfair, if made by 
the local authorities instead of a private supplier.  
 
Question 2: At a sightseeing point reachable only on foot a well has been tapped. The bottled water 
is sold from local authorities to thirsty hikers. The price is 1 CHF (Swiss Franc) per 
bottle. Daily production, and thus the stock, is 100 bottles. On a particularly hot day 200 
hikers want to buy a bottle. As a consequence the supplier raises the price to 2 CHF per 
bottle. What do you think about this price rise? 
 
Next we state that any surplus revenue generated through the price increase will be donated to an 
aid agency (Red Cross) and again ask to rate the level of fairness of the price rise. Do attitudes 
towards the price rise change if excess profits are donated? Foster (2001) argued that on the one 
end of the spectrum there is an embarrassment motivation which means that a person is ashamed 
to appear to be ungenerous. Thus, the person gives in order to escape from such an embarrassing 
situation, reducing so his/her moral costs. As a second motivation, individuals enjoy the feeling 
of their own generosity (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992). Furthermore, individuals can see 
charitable donation as a kind of insurance to finance a safety net service. In the shadow of the 
future (“veil of uncertainty”) they may profit themselves. Indirectly, they benefit, insofar as 
charity services strengthen the social fabric. Thus the following hypothesis can be formulated 
from question 3: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Students sense the price system as fairer when the revenue is handed over to a charitable 
institution. 
 
Question 3: Suppose the well owner would hand over the surplus revenue from the price increase to 
the Red Cross. What do you think about this price rise? 
 
As an extension to this scenario, we added a need based occurrence, such that on a hot day some 
individuals suffer from the heat and need water. People might feel that the supplier was not 
entitled to a rent increase in a situation where people urgently need the water. On the other hand, 
the supplier had not contributed in any way to such a hot day situation which even leads to heat 
stroke. From this the following hypothesis can be formulated against question 4: 
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Hypothesis 3: In emergency situation, students evaluate the price adaptation from 1 CHF to 2 CHF in 
an urgent situation as more unfair compared to a normal situation.  
 
Question 4: On a particularly hot day, some people have a heat stroke. The private seller raises the 
price to 2 CHF per bottle of water. Do you find the price more acceptable, equally 
acceptable or less acceptable than when such an emergency case did not occur? 
 
Additionally we asked if the introduction of additional information was made available to hikers 
at the beginning of the footpath, made a difference to perceptions of fairness by stating that 
demand sometimes exceeds daily stocks of water. Information is needed to formulate 
expectations about the value of a specific alternative, this leads to our next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The better a hiker is informed about a possible excess demand situation, the better he/she 
can build expectations and the higher the evaluated fairness of a price system.  
 
Question 5: At the beginning of the footpath the hikers are informed, that the demand for water 
sometimes exceeds the daily stock. Do you consider the price increase to 2 CHF by the 
supplier to be more acceptable, equally acceptable or less acceptable than if they were 
not informed? 
 
We then asked if the supplier had a second product available, at a higher price and on the hot 
days this product was also raised, would the price rise of the first product be equally, less or 
more acceptable than if the second product did not exist. Implementing another product enlarges 
the probability set of an individual and as Frey and Pommerehne (1988) state it could be 
expected that this would make people more content. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The price increase for the more expensive beverage is considered to be fairer because 
hikers have the possibility to choose the other beverage. 
 
Question 6: Consider the following situation: The supplier at the sight-seeing point offers a more 
expensive beverage at 5 CHF per bottle. On a particularly hot day the price of this more 
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expensive beverage is raised to 8 CHF. Do you consider this price rise to be more 
acceptable, equally acceptable, less acceptable than if this second offer did not exist? 
 
Finally we included a competitor nearby, and asked if only the original supplier raised the price 
would this be equally, more or less acceptable. Like the additional product line added in the 
previous question, competition can be seen as an expansion of individuals’ choice set. By 
integrating another supplier, people have the chance to use the exit option if they are unhappy 
and switch from one supplier to the other.  
 
Hypothesis 6: The introduction of an additional supplier has the consequence that the price increase for 
bottles of water by the first supplier is considered to be fairer because the hiker can easily 
switch to the other supplier. 
 
Question 7: We have now a situation in which another supplier located near the sight-seeing point 
also offers water, but at a price of 1 CHF per bottle. Do you consider the price increase 
to 2 CHF by the supplier at the sight-seeing point to be more acceptable, equally 
acceptable or less acceptable? 
 
While analysing a system, it is always important to compare different alternatives together. Thus, 
new institutions have been implemented including: queuing (“first come, first served”), random 
allocations, allocation by the local government, auction, and finally allocation by need (“weaker 
first”). 
Where possible our results are compared with the Frey and Pommerehne (1988) findings, the 
intention is to determine the robustness of their findings by changing singular parameters such as 
group structure. This procedure is similar to experiments where small changes in the design are 
used to test the robustness of results. This allows testing the robustness of the design and to avoid 
erroneous conclusions. Interestingly, we are not observing enough papers that test the robustness 
of results. Rubinstein (2001), e.g., stresses that the current incentive system does not reward 
replications. He brings an appropriate example: 
 
“Let us say you are a researcher who is interested in a paper by Prof. X who claims to have found 
something quite interesting. Let us say that you find the results plausible but you are not sure that the 
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experiment was done properly and that indeed conclusion is valid. Do you have any incentive to 
repeat the experiment? No, because no one would publish it. Yet, you are interested in the subject 
matter and you probably think that Prof. X’s finding is sensitive to a certain key detail of the 
experiment. Now you are quite eager to demonstrate your point and to publish a paper. In order to do 
that you have to first confirm Prof. X’s basic claim. If you fail to repeat Prof. X’s result, your point is 
lost. Thus, you approach the experiment with a desire to confirm the published result” (p. 626). 
 
Furthermore, we have expanded the comparative analysis implementing more institutions and we 
explore the determinants of a price system’s perceived fairness and its alternatives using a 
multivariate analysis. Similar to experiments we controlled for a few parameters: all students 
were from the same classes and filled out the survey at the same time in the same room. 
Compared to the study of Frey and Pommerehne (1988) we found that the price system was 
much more accepted. But this result cannot simply be interpreted as an indication of the impact 
of indoctrination. First of all, the two data sets are not comparable. Furthermore, (Frey and Meier 
2005) offer empirical evidence against the belief that professional economists are in general 
more selfish than other persons. Using a wide data set they show that economic training does not 
make people act more selfish. Furthermore, our analysis has a strong comparative perspective.  
In general, hypothetical questions offer the chance to investigate in a simple manner theoretical 
questions in regards to fairness in an excess demand situation. However, such an approach assumes that 
individuals know how they may behave in actual situations and assumes that individuals have no special 
reason to disguise their true preferences (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Exploring risk aversion with 
laboratory experiments Holt and Laury (2002) compared behaviour under real and hypothetical incentives 
for lotteries that ranged from several dollars up to several hundred dollars. Their results indicate 
substantial differences between hypothetical and real payoffs in high payoff tasks (higher level of risk 
aversion for real payoffs). They therefore criticise that their findings “raises questions about the validity 
of Kahneman and Tversky’s suggested technique of using hypothetical questionnaires to address issues 
that involve very high stakes. In particular, it casts doubt on their assumption that “people often know 
how they would behave in actual situations of choice”” (p. 1650). 
 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Looking at Table 1 we observe that raising the price via price system, as a consequence of excess 
demand, is deemed to be unfair by only 19.4% of respondents. More students found it “fair” 
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(26.9%). 73.1% found it fair or acceptable. More than half of the people thought the price system 
acceptable. Frey and Pommerehne (1988) report that only 22% found the price system fair or 
acceptable compared to 78% judging it unfair. As our results differ strongly from their findings 
one reason could be that economics students already have some knowledge about economics and 
a more specific knowledge about price systems than an average householder
2
. However, such 
conclusions should be treated with caution. What can be said is that the price system has been 
evaluated as a quite acceptable institution to solve an excess demand situation. Next we 
implemented a second system of allocation, a shift from private to public supplier, where now 
the local government has been instituted as controlling the excess demand. If we let the price 
system work, changing the supplier from a private supplier to the local authorities, we would 
predict that acceptance would fall. Results in Table 1 indeed indicate that public enterprises’ 
announcement of a price rise for their services often causes relatively strong opposition. 
A large proportion of individuals (46.2%) evaluated the use of the price system by the 
government as unfair. To better compare the two systems (government versus private supplier) 
we asked “If you compare question 1 with question 2, how do you judge government’s price 
increase?” We find a strong support of hypothesis 1. Students deemed the government’s 
adaptation less acceptable. 51.6% of the students found it less acceptable and 36.6% were 
neutral. Only 11.8% find the government intervention as more acceptable. Frey and Pommerehne 
(1988) obtained similar results. The students thought it is unfair for the government to take profit 
from the shortage situation raising the price and thus increasing revenue. But when these excess 
profits are donated to charity, would we observe a shift in fairness perceptions? Almost 50 
percent of the students found that surplus revenue distribution to the Red Cross was fair, 92.5% 
evaluated it as fair and acceptable, providing strong support for hypothesis 2. This indicates that 
fairness is strongly correlated to distribution justice. The results of Frey and Pommerehne (1988) 
were similar. However, the percent of households thinking the charity to be unfair was higher. 
27% found it unfair and 8% found it very unfair.  
 
                                                          
2
  Or we may observe a selection effect. Students more in favour of a price system are more likely to study 
 economics than other (social) sciences.  
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Table 1: Fairness of Allocation Systems 
  Allocation via Price 
System by a Private 
Supplier 
Allocation via 
Price System by 
the Government 
Surplus Revenue 
Distribution to the 
Red Cross 
Unfair 19.4% 46.2% 7.5% 
Acceptable 53.8% 40.9% 43% 
Fair 26.9% 12.9% 49.5% 
 
Allocation via Price System by the 
Government  
Less acceptable 51.6%  
Equally acceptable 36.6%  
More acceptable 11.8%  
 
 
In a next step we explore in a multivariate analysis what shapes these differences. Table 2 
presents the results using an ordered probit model. The ordered probit models are relevant in 
such an analysis insofar as they help analyse the ranking information of the scaled dependent 
variables (level of fairness of the price system/surplus distribution via the Red Cross or in the 
comparative analysis the acceptability difference between the price system done by a private 
supplier and the government). However, as in the ordered probit estimation the equation has a 
nonlinear form, only the sign of the coefficient can be directly interpreted and not its size. 
Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a method to find the quantitative effect a variable 
has on our dependent variables. The marginal effect indicates the change in the share of students 
(or the probability of) belonging to a specific fairness/acceptability level, when the independent 
variable increases by one unit. In the results the marginal effects are presented only for the 
highest values. In some estimations we will have missing values
3
 which explains the lower 
number of observations. Table 2 presents the results. Equation (1) shows that females found the 
price less fair than males. The quantitative effects indicate that being female rather than male 
reduces the probability of stating that the price increase by a private supplier is fair by 27.3 
percentage points. This is quite a large effect. In the specifications (2) and (3) we add further 
factors. Fiscal exchange is a proxy that measures whether subjects are satisfied with 
government’s provisions4. A higher value may be related to a higher level of government 
                                                          
3
  For example due to don’t know or no response answers.  
4
  Question: Looking at the returns of the state (based on your nationality) for the taxes paid would you say 
 that the returns are rather good (value 3), adequate (value 2), rather bad (value 1). One should note that 
 don’t know has been coded as a missing value.  
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acceptability. This is nicely observable in specifications (4) and (5). An increase in the fiscal 
exchange scale by one unit increases the probability of stating that the price system allocation via 
the government is more acceptable by around 7 percentage points. On the other hand, it reduces 
the perceived fairness of a market system as can be seen in equation (2) and (3) with marginal 
effects of more than 10 percentage points. An age dummy variable has been built to explore 
whether age matters
5
. The results in specifications (3) and (5) show that there is no age effect. In 
addition we explore whether there is a difference between doing an economic major or minor. 
One could argue that individuals studying a major may be more in favour of the market system 
approach. However, equation (5) indicates that we don’t observe a statistically significant 
difference between individuals doing an economic major or minor. In addition, we observe that 
working part-time (earning own money) has no effect on individuals’ fairness perceptions. 
Interestingly, we observe an age effect when focusing on the perceived fairness of handing over 
the surplus revenue from the price increase to the Red Cross. Being in the age bracket 24 to 44 
rather than in the reference group reduces the probability of reporting that such an approach is 
fair by 21.5 percentage points. Moreover, we also observe that individuals doing an economics 
major have a lower probability stating that such a strategy is fair. The effect is quite large as we 
can see in specification (6). Doing an economics major reduces the probability of stating that this 
is a fair strategy by 53.9 percentage points. In specification (6) we also explore whether 
institutional trust
6
 is correlated with a higher support for a distribution to an international 
organization such as the Red Cross. Brewer et al. (2004, 2005) argue that individuals may derive 
their trust in international organizations from even more general forms of trust and Torgler 
(2008) finds empirical support for such spillover effects. The results indeed indicate a positive 
correlation. An increase in the institutional trust index by one unit from the average increases the 
probability of stressing that the Red Cross solution is fair by 2 percentage points.  
 
 
                                                          
5
  The average age was 23. Due to the lack of variability we build a dummy for being above the average.  
6
  Index based on the level of confidence in the press, the radio, television, the legal system, the police, the 
 army, labour unions, work organisations, large private companies, independent experts, political parties, 
 local authorities (at the communal and cantonal level), federal government, the two chambers (Nationalrat 
 and Staenderat), the federal administration, the European Union, and the United Nations. Scale for each 
 institution: none at all (0), not very much confidence (1), quite a lot of confidence (2), a lot of confidence 
 (3). The index goes from 15 to 55 with a mean value of 28.  
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Table 2: Determinants of Fairness of Allocation Systems 
 
Ordered Probit Models 
Dependent Variables Fairness Allocation via Price System 
by a Private Supplier 
 
 
Acceptability Compared to 
Allocation via Price 
System by the Government 
 
Surplus 
Revenue 
Distribution 
to the Red 
Cross 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
Variables:       
       
Female -0.651** -0.664** -0.726** -0.012 -0.045 0.396 
 z-value -2.44 -2.41 -2.41 -0.17 -0.13 1.01 
 marg. effect 0.273 -0.201 -0.210 -0.012 -0.009 0.149 
       
Fiscal Exchange  -0.394** -0.337* 0.072* 0.332*  
 z-value  -2.06 -1.79 1.83 1.71  
 marg. effect  -0.135 -0.112 0.072 0.069  
       
Age 24 to 44   -0.435  0.186 -0.546* 
 z-value   -1.45  0.61 -1.92 
 marg. effect   -0.134  0.041 -0.215 
       
Economics Major     0.230 -5.160*** 
 z-value     0.62 -22.12 
 marg. effect     0.043 -0.539 
       
Working Part-Time   -0.320  0.132 0.263 
 z-value   -1.09  0.43 0.81 
 marg. effect   -0.111  0.027 0.103 
       
Trust in Institutions      0.048** 
 z-value      2.42 
 marg. effect      0.019 
       
N 89 83 82 83 82 83 
Pseudo R2 0.0297 0.0452 0.0647 0.0165 0.0195 0.1193 
Notes: The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Reference 
groups: Male, Age 20 to 23, Economics Minor, Not Working Part-Time. 
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Table 3: Scenario Extension 
 
 Hot Day with 
Heat Stroke 
Information to 
the Subjects 
Price Increase 
of a further 
Beverage 
Competition 
Less acceptable 63.4% 5.4% 12.9% 8.6% 
Equally acceptable 34.4% 30.1% 49.5% 50.5% 
More acceptable 1.1% 63.4% 37.6% 39.8% 
No response 1.1% 1.1% 0% 1.1% 
 
Next we added an emergency type situation and assume that some people are suffering heat 
stroke and require water. The results in Table 3 seem to confirm our expectations, as 63.4 % find 
it less acceptable to raise prices in light of the urgent need supporting hypothesis 3. While the 
supplier may not have created the hot day, people feel that the supplier is not entitled to take 
advantage in a situation where people have an urgent need. We included the availability of 
additional information to climbers prior to starting out on the footpath this information indicated 
that it was possible that water would be in shortage. Moreover, as information is needed to 
formulate expectations about the value of a specific alternative, it is not surprising that the results 
in Table 3 seem to support the hypothesis. The findings show that 59% of the students found it 
more acceptable if they were provided more information about the water availability. By now 
including another product to the suppliers range we have effectively increased the options of an 
individual, which should increase contentment and thus acceptability. Contrary to the findings of 
Frey and Pommerehne (1988), subjects found the price system more acceptable (37.6%) or at 
least equally acceptable (49.5%). Frey and Pommerehne reported that 55% of the subjects found 
it less acceptable. As already seen, these results are compatible with the other findings that 
economics students have a certain experience in following economic theory. In the next question, 
we added an additional supplier, which can be viewed like the additional product as expanding 
the individual’s choices and giving them the ability to switch from one supplier to the other. 
According to our findings in the previous question we should see similar results. Table 3 
confirms our expectations: 39.8% found it more acceptable and 50.5% equally acceptable and 
only 8.6% less acceptable. This result is also different from Frey and Pommerehne (52% found it 
less acceptable).  
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
While analysing a system, it is always important to compare different alternatives together. Thus 
all the allocation systems have been included together, including now also: First come first 
served (queuing), random allocation (lottery), government (authoritarian) allocation, auction, and 
weaker first (needs). We provide a cursory discussion for each of these allocation types then 
Table 4 and 5 display the comparative results. 
 
1. First Come, First Served 
This institution allocates solely by using time and thus effort as criteria. This rule is applied 
often. Imagine, for example, the allocation of seats in a train, bus, tram or street parking. 
Oberholzer-Gee (2006, p. 427) points out:  
 
“Car dealerships deliver vehicles in the order in which they were purchased. At airports, 
passengers are by and large checked in in the order in which they arrive. Theme parks use waiting 
lines to allocate seats on popular rides. VeriSign, Inc., the Internet firm, has developed a service 
which allows parties to be next in line to obtain a currently used domain name once it is deleted 
from the registry. Call centers queue calls, and the organizers of sport and entertainment events 
typically sell tickets on a first-come, first-served basis. Government agencies and nonprofit 
organizations commonly use waiting lists to allocate scarce resources. Health services, housing 
vouchers, rooms in nursing homes, hangars at airports, and spots in daycare centers are frequently 
made available in the order in which applications for these services were received. Universities 
use waiting lists to allocate seats in popular courses, student housing, books from the library and 
parking spaces.  
 
However, the rule fails to consider the need of a person, which could be relevant, when there is 
an excess demand of water. Elster (1989b) distinguishes between two sorts of queues: i) 
voluntary standing in line (queues of immigrant visas, consumer goods) or ii) formed by natural 
process (e.g., care units after a disaster). This type of allocation is purely a function of time of 
arrival (time in queue) and is not dependent on other factors like age, gender, class etc. In times 
of scarcity individuals can be viewed as having two competing and diametrically opposed 
natures: individualism based on rational self-interest and egalitarianism based on social justice 
and fairness (Singer 1999). Our situation is placed somehow between both distinctions. 
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According to a natural process (hot day) people are thirsty and want to drink water which is 
scarce. First come, first served can lead to a queue, which has the disadvantage of wasteful 
allocation. Queuing is similar to paying a price, but nobody collects the price and benefits from it 
(Elster 1989b). Queuing behaviour can be viewed as an attempt at solving several competing 
issues: firstly it can be seen as an attempt to maximise social welfare (Hassin and Haviv 2006); 
secondly resolution of the scarcity of resources; or ordered queues can be used in an attempt to 
maintain some level of social justice or fairness (Avi-Itzhak and Levy 2004, Avi-Itzhak, Levy 
and Raz 2005, Larson 1987). 
 
2. Random Distribution 
Random procedures have a long and varied history. Oberholzer-Gee, Bohnet and Frey (1997) 
illustrate some examples. At the University of Basle, in the seventeenth century, subjects to teach 
were appointed in a lottery. As a consequence, Jakob Bernoulli had to teach medicine instead of 
mathematics. Furthermore, in the Roman Republic, a large number of important decisions were 
taken by lottery, e.g., the allocation of provinces amongst the senators. In Athens almost all 
officials and council members were chosen by lottery. Generals and a small number of 
magistrates (chosen by direct election) needing special qualifications were exceptions (Elster 
1989b). 
Today, random lotteries are used, for example, in the awarding of oil drilling, tax auditing, 
public house allocations, educational institutions or immigration
7
. They even play a role in 
political contexts
8
. The use of random distribution is associated with uncertainty and social 
indifference. Each hiker has the same chance of being selected. Thus, lotteries are blind towards 
personal characteristics. Oberholzer-Gee, Bohnet and Frey (1997) point out that a lottery is only 
socially acceptable if competence is available. Professors’ subjects could be randomly 
distributed, because competence was given by appointing capable universal scholars to the 
University of Basle. Elster (1989b) argues that “I know of no instance of social lotteries without 
                                                          
7
  The Diversity Visa Lottery, an annual event whereby prospective immigrants with no hope of family 
 sponsorship can receive a green card to come to America.  
8
  Elster (1989b) reports an example occurred in Sweden after the election 1973. After a tie between the 
 socialist and the nonsocialist blocs in Parliament, decision was made tossing a coin. Furthermore, Elster 
 discussed the pros and cons of a lottery voting. Other authors as Lindbeck (1976) proposed randomly timed 
 elections and Thaler (1999) suggested assigning members of U.S. congress randomly, to congressional 
 committees.  
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some pre-selection or post-selection scrutiny on the basis of need, merit and the like” (1989b, p. 
68).  
 
3. Distribution by the Local Government 
This allocation system is based on the adjudication of a group of people, chosen in a democratic 
process. According to Frey and Pommerehne (1988), the distribution of water is made by the 
“local authorities” according to their respective judgement. This reduces a possible framing 
effect by the word “government”, leading to negative feelings. Local authorities follow certain 
administrative rules. However, despite such constitutional rules can induce governmental agents 
to act for the citizens, there exists a certain asymmetric information and thus a principal-agent 
problem. The government has an information advantage over the citizens, which enables it to 
anticipate the future decision and to act for its own advantage. Buchanan (1975) points out that it 
is unrealistic to expect that elected officials neither have personal preferences nor exercise their 
influence over collective outcomes. Thus, it can be doubted whether the distribution is fair or 
even efficient, where goods are scarce, incentives for rent-seeking activities increase. In some 
countries instrumental friendship is an important mechanism in the allocation of scarce goods 
(see Elster 1989b).  
 
4. Auction 
Auctions have been used circa 500 BC in Babylon (Cassady 1967). Furthermore, the Romans 
used auctions in commerce very often (Smith 1987). Allocation by auction creates a market 
system. Auctions are often seen as mechanisms for generating a fair price, as they allocate an 
item to the buyer who values it most highly. Thus, there appears to be consistency with price 
system or competition. It can be hypothesised that auction will be evaluated in a similar way as 
the price system. We informed the subjects about the English auction system, because it is the 
best known
9
.  
 
5. “Weaker First” 
                                                          
9
  In the English Auction, the standing bid cannot be withdrawn. Any new bid is admissible if it is higher than 
 the standing bid. The auction ends when there is no new higher bid. The last amount is the final price. 
 There are other types of auctions, the most commonly used are: Dutch, Japanese, Sealed-bid or Second-
 price auctions (see Smith 1987). These rules are important because they can affect the bidding incentives 
 (see Vickrey 1961).  
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Need could be an important criteria for fairness consideration. Therefore, we implemented an 
institution which takes in consideration that at the beginning some have a disadvantage 
compared to others. This means that a favoured group has an advantage over others. Weaker 
people (e.g., pregnant women, children, handicapped, old people) are at a very low welfare level 
because of some sort of handicap. Thus, this category is defined by status. This rule is often used 
in disaster situations like ship accidents. Elderly people, e.g., are favoured because they have 
already done much for society and enable us to enjoy our present standard. Giving them priority 
in the competition for scarce water is a way to pay it back. However, if we had to choose 
between a young father or an older man dying for thirst, which one would be selected? It can be 
argued that the old man should have a lower priority because helping the young father helps to 
save more life years. Our situation is certainly not so dramatic. Here, younger hikers may be 
more robust to the hot temperature and thus need less water to go on further.  
To evaluate these allocation systems, people had to arrange the different institutions 
according to their fairness. This enables us to build a ranking between them (see Table 4 and 5). 
First of all, we wanted to see which system has been judged as the fairest solution. Table 4 
indicates that “weak people first” seems to be seen as the fairest solution to an excess demand 
situation. However, Table 4 does not give full information about the exact ranking of the 
institutions.  
 
Table 4: Fairest Solution 
 
 Percent Cumulative Percent 
Weak People First 53.8 53.8 
First Come, First Serve 16.1 69.9 
Price System 9.7 79.6 
Auction System 8.6 88.2 
Government Distribution 1.1 89.3 
Random Procedure 1.1 90.4 
No Answer 9.6 100.0 
Total 100.0  
             
 
Because “weak people first” was the fairest solution with such a clear result we did not put it into 
account in Table 5. Table 5 can be read, e.g., as follows: 71% of the people found the institution 
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“first come first serve” fairer than a “random distribution”. It has a similar structure as Table 4. 
However, “government distribution” is in a better light, almost equal to the “auction system”. 
Furthermore, the “price system” is evaluated as fairer than the “auction system” and the “random 
system” is clearly seen as the most unfair one.        
Putting into account the terms of efficiency, the ranking might be different. What are the 
reasons that ordering differs when procedures are ranked by their fairness? The results confirm 
that institutions taking account of the “need” of a person are considered to be fairer than others. 
This explains why “weak people first” is seen as the fairest solution. Society has a certain 
tradition to following this rule. Humanitarian agencies often first evacuate “vulnerable” and 
“innocent” civilians such as women, children and the elderly. The Geneva Convention provides 
special protection and evacuation priority for pregnant women and mothers of young children 
(Carpenter 2003). 
In line with the findings of Frey and Pommerehne (1988), “first come, first served” is 
considered to be quite fair. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986b) asked the question to 191 
adults in Vancouver confronting them with the situation where there is an excess demand of 
football tickets. They give the subjects three distribution systems: auction, lottery and queue 
(first-come first-served basis). They found similar results for the queue. Queue was evaluated as 
the fairest (68%) method, followed by lottery (28%) and the auction (4%). However, why is 
“first come, first served” seen as highly fair? The willingness to wait and stand in line can be 
seen as a measure of the need for the good (Elster 1989b). Furthermore, despite the possibility of 
inefficiency, waiting can also be seen as an effort. Oberholzer-Gee (2007) conducted a field 
experiment covering 500 individuals waiting in line at different locations in Philadelphia to 
explore the willingness to accept additional waiting time in exchange for a monetary payment. A 
large majority of individuals (62%) granted the request to jump the queue and higher offers lead 
to greater success even in the case where the individual ends up not accepting the compensation. 
In fact most individuals refused to be compensated. It could be that subjects read price signals as 
indicators for the experimenter’s opportunity cost of time.  
The most convincing argument can be that “first come, first served” does not include 
money in allocating scarce water. This argument can also stand for random mechanism or local 
government distribution. However, waiting creates a disadvantage to those people having higher 
opportunity costs, as, e.g., richer people, and as a sort of “neutral” mechanism prevents from 
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favouritism or bribery. In our example, favouritism would be difficult to realise, because of 
transparency and identification. Another important argument is that “first come, first served” is a 
system which enables individuals to have clear expectations. If you get up early in the morning, 
there is a higher chance to get water. Moreover, the sellers may have interest to generate queues 
as it signals a desirable product (Oberholzer-Gee 2006).  
 
Table 5: Comparative Analysis Between the Different Systems 
 
is fairer than (%)  
First Come,  
First Serve 
 
Price 
System 
 
Auction 
 
Government 
Distribution 
Random 
Procedure 
 
 
 
First Come, First Serve - 45 
i
 56 56 71 
Price System  - 58 57 67 
Auction System 
  - 42
 ii
 45
 iii
 
Government Distribution    - 48
 iv
 
Random Procedure 
 
    - 
Notes:
 i
 39% believe that Price System is fairer (9% did not answer); 
ii
 for 41% of the people the government 
distribution is fairer (10% did not answer); 
iii
 39 % did not agree and 9% did not answer; 
iv
36% did not agree, and 
9% did not answer). 
 
 
 
It is also surprising that random procedure has been evaluated as the worst solution, despite this 
rule puts into account “social blindness”. Why are random procedures so rarely seen as a fair 
system? Elster (1989b, pp. 116-121) searches for reason why lotteries are not so often used as 
expected: i) people want to have reasons for what they do, ii) people dislike making close 
decisions, iii) inability to keep the ex ante perspective firmly in mind. An ex post wrong decision 
may be the best choice in the ex ante situation. A military commander, as Elster (1989b) argues, 
who chooses the attack plan by random process (e.g., flip a coin) to confound the enemy, might 
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be strongly criticised when things go wrong, iv) the most interesting argument, the attachment to 
the process. Elster (1989b, pp. 118-119) stresses that:  
 
“First, one may argue that in the long run respecting procedural values leads to better substantive 
outcomes, even if in a given case they may appear burdensome and pointless (...) Second, one 
may argue that even when the outcome is substantially the same whether or not these values are 
respected they have an independent importance (...) Third, one may argue that some process 
values are so important that they should be respected even when the final decision is thereby 
made substantively less good (Elster 1989b, pp. 118-119).  
 
Contrary to the findings of Frey and Pommerehne (1988), the price system again was placed 
quite better at rank three. These findings seem to confirm that economics students have less 
concern about the unfairness of the price system.  
In Table 6 we explore what factors influence the number one choice “weak people first”. 
We have used a probit model (1=weak people first choice, 0=other choices). As can be seen 
gender is the major factors. Being female rather than male increases ceteris paribus the 
probability of stating that the solution “weak people first” is the fairest by more than 28 
percentage points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Determinants of “Weak People First” 
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Probit Models 
Dependent Variable Fairest Solution: 
 
Weak People First 
  (7) (8) 
Independent Variables:   
    
Female 0.814** 0.813** 
 z-value 2.29 2.28 
 marg. effect 0.607 0.282 
    
    
Age 24 to 44  0.267 
 z-value  0.78 
 marg. effect  0.016 
    
Economics Major  -0.321 
 z-value  -0.4 
 marg. effect  -0.116 
    
Working Part-Time  0.043 
 z-value  0.13 
 marg. effect  0.099 
    
N 82 81 
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.057 
Notes: The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Reference groups: Male, Age 20 to 23, Economics Minor, Not Working Part-
Time. 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
A main purpose of this paper was to better understand the conditions for the acceptability of 
different allocation systems and to evaluate what makes a price system more or less fair. After 
discussing general tendencies in the fairness literature, the starting point was a situation stamped 
by scarcity. Based on the work of Frey and Pommerehne (1988, 1993) who might have been 
influenced by the work of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986a), we analysed how economics 
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students evaluate different allocation systems. Fairness in an arrangement depends on the 
institutional background, e.g., information transparency and competition let the price system 
appear as fairer. Compared to the Frey and Pommerehne subjects, economics students were 
much less sceptical towards the price system. However, we also observe that females are more 
sceptical than males. Women are also more in favour of a “weak people first” solution 
(compared to other strategies) in an excess demand situation than men. In addition, a higher 
perceived fiscal exchange is correlated with a higher level of acceptance for having the local 
government regulate the price increase in case of a shortage. We also observe in line with 
Torgler (2008) spillover effects. A higher level of institutional trust is correlates with a higher 
support for redistributing the revenue surpluses (due to the price increase) to an international aid 
organization, namely Red Cross.  
In reality we find that sellers do care about fairness. Ski resorts in Switzerland and 
bathing resorts in Italy or Spain, e.g., are often characterised by an excess demand, with long lift 
queues and crowded slopes and strands. Why do sellers not simply raise the rates and earn the 
extra revenues? And why do the most popular restaurants have reservation lists for more than a 
month? Frank (1988) argues that in such a situation pricing patterns differ substantially from a 
self-interest model. In many cases, fairness seems to play a certain role.  
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